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CONDITIONING A WOMAN'S PROBATION
ON HER USING NORPLANT: NEW
WEAPON AGAINST CHILD ABUSE
BACKFIRES
SCOTT J. JEBSON*
Several courts have required female child abusers to choose
between either going to prison or accepting the surgical implantation of Norplant as a condition of probation. In this Article, Mr.
Jebson argues that a Norplant probation condition is invalid
because it is both unreasonableand the probationercannot give
her informed consent to the procedure. Mr. Jebson argues that
requiringa woman to choose between using Norplant and going to
prison may violate her fundamental right to procreate,her right to
be free from cruel and unusualpunishment, and her right to freely
exercise her religion. Further, the Author also contends that
requiring the use of Norplant may violate the Equal Protection
Clause because similarly situated male and female child abusers
are treated differently. As an alternative to Norplant, Mr. Jebson
recommends a rehabilitative procedure which both male and
female child abusers could receive as a condition ofprobationwithout infringing on fundamental rights.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States incarcerates hundreds of thousands of convicted criminals each year. Punishing criminals by incarcerating
them, however, has come under heavy criticism because of its high
costs and because incarcerating criminals does little to rehabilitate them. As a result, judges have attempted to design alternative methods of sentencing criminals. One such alternative is to
place the criminal on probation, accompanied with restrictive conditions designed to rehabilitate the criminal. Probation is often a
desirable alternative to incarceration because judges have wide
discretion in designing and imposing conditions of probation.
Therefore, judges can tailor the probation conditions in a way that
* J.D., magna cum laude, John Marshall Law School; LL.M. candidate,
New York University School of Law. The Author will be clerking for the
Honorable Michael J. Colwell, Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, in the
Spring of 1995.
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best serves the needs of the offender and the public at large. Many
judges, however, have recently imposed a number of controversial
probation conditions. Arguably, one of the most controversial
probation conditions ever imposed by a judge occurred in People v.
Johnson.1

In Johnson, a California Superior Court judge sentenced
Darlene Johnson, a convicted child abuser, to use Norplant for
three years while on probation.2 Norplant is a contraceptive
device that is surgically implanted beneath the skin of a woman's
arm. Ms. Johnson appealed the judge's probation order, claiming
that such a probation condition was unconstitutional. Johnson's
appeal, however, became moot when she was sent to prison for
violating other probation conditions. Many judges have praised
the Norplant probation condition, which strongly suggests that
more judges will impose this probation condition in the future.3 It
is for this reason that I wrote this Article.
This Article establishes that a judge cannot order a woman to
use Norplant as a condition of probation. First, Part II describes
Norplant and how it works. Part III discusses the non-constitutional grounds on which a defendant can challenge Norplant as a
condition of probation. This section argues that this condition of
probation is invalid because it is unreasonable and because a probationer cannot give her informed consent. Additionally, this section discusses the potential civil liability to a state which forces a
woman to use Norplant as a condition of probation. Part IV of this
Article analyzes the constitutional implications of conditioning a
woman's probation on her using Norplant. Specifically, this section shows that forcing a woman to use Norplant as a condition of
probation is invalid because such a condition violates a probationer's fundamental right to procreate, violates a probationer's
fundamental right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
may violate a probationer's fundamental right to freely exercise
her religion, and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part V proposes an alternative probation
1. No. 29390 (Super. Ct., Tulare County, Ca., Jan. 2, 1991).
2. In Johnson, the judge imposed the Norplant probation condition less than

a month after the federal government approved Norplant. Tamar Lewin,
Implanted Birth Control Device Renews Debate Over Forced Contraception,L.A.
TIMES,

Jan. 10, 1991, at 3.

3. See, e.g., State v. Carlton (Neb. County Ct., Lincoln County (1991) (CR901937)).
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condition that is reasonable, involves no informed consent problem, and does not violate a probationer's constitutional rights.
II.

WHAT Is NoRPLANr

Norplant is a new contraceptive device that the Food and
Drug Administration approved in 1990. 4 The Norplant device con-

sists of six rubber tubes, containing synthetic hormones, which
are surgically inserted beneath the skin of a woman's arm.5 Once
inserted, the tubes release the synthetic hormones that prevent
conception for up to five years.6 If a woman decides that she no
longer wants to use Norplant, a physician must surgically remove
the Norplant device. 7 Norplant may seem appealing to use as a
probation condition because it is effective for a long period of time,
and a probationer's compliance with probation would be practically guaranteed since Norplant can only be removed by surgery."
However, even though Norplant is an appealing probation condition, there are constitutional and non-constitutional reasons why
a judge cannot order a woman to use Norplant as a condition of
probation.
III.

NON-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING THE
NoRPLANT PROBATION CONDITION

This section sets out the non-constitutional reasons why a
judge cannot order a woman to use Norplant as a condition of probation. Part A argues that Norplant as a condition of probation is
invalid because such use is not reasonable. Part B argues that
using Norplant is invalid because a probationer cannot give her
informed consent. Part C discusses the potential civil liability to a
state that uses the Norplant probation condition.

4. Lewin, supra note 2, at A20.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995

3

304

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:301

A.

The Norplant Probation Condition is Not a "Reasonable"
ProbationCondition
The authority of a federal or state judge to impose probation 9
is based on statutes.' 0 Although probation statutes may differ in
their particulars, they generally give the sentencing judge broad
discretion in determining and imposing probation conditions."
This discretion, however, is not limitless. 12 Probation conditions
must be reasonable. 13 The California Appellate Court in People v.
Dominguez 14 set out a widely accepted three-part test to determine if a probation condition is reasonable. 15 According to the
9. "Probation" is defined as the "[s]entence imposed for commission of crime
whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into the community under the
supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration." BLACes LAW
DIcTIoNARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990). In United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358
(1928), the Supreme Court described probation as "the attempted saving of a
man who has taken one wrong step and whom the judge thinks to be a brand who
can be plucked from burning at the time of the imposition of the sentence."
10. The statutory basis for probation in the federal courts is the Federal
Probation Act. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1979). For a
list of the probation statutes in each of the 50 states, see Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs
of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URB. &
ComTEM. L. 291, 301 (1990).
11. There are generally three types of probation statutes. Leonore H. Tavill,
Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation
Condition, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 613, 621 (1988). The first type of probation
statute sets forth no specific conditions of probation. Id. Instead, the statute
allows the court to impose conditions of probation that the court deems
appropriate. Id. The second type of probation statute sets forth some mandatory
conditions of probation, yet allows a court to impose other conditions the court
deems suitable. Id. The third type of probation statute lists a number of specific
conditions that a court may impose. Id. This type of statute allows a court to
impose additional conditions as long as they are reasonable. Id.
12. Id.
13. E.g., People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding that in order for probation conditions to be valid, they must reasonably
relate to the purpose of probation).
14. Id.
15. Id. In addition to California, a number of other states have adopted the
Dominguez test. See Rodridguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Russell v. State, 342 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v.
Perbix, 331 N.W.2d 14, 18 (N.D. 1983); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136, 139
(N.D. 1972); State v. Taylor, 717 P.2d 64, 72 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Jones,
550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976); State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 1977); Simpson
v. State, 772 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) State v. Emery, 593 A.2d 77,
79 (Vt. 1991); State v. Whitchurch, 577 A.2d 690, 691 (Vt. 1990); Lancing v.
State, 669 P.2d 923, 928 (Wyo. 1983); State v. Garner, 194 N.W.2d 649, 652,
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Dominguez test, a probation condition is not reasonable if the
condition:
(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids16conduct which is not reasonably related to
future criminality.

If the probation condition meets all three criteria of the
Dominguez test, the condition is held not to be reasonable, and is
therefore invalid. 17 A case which applied the Dominguez test and
which is directly on point with the "Norplant" scenairo is Rodriguez v. State.'
In Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of child abuse.' 9
The judge placed the defendant on probation with the condition
that she not become pregnant during the probationary period.2 °
The Rodriguez court applied the Dominguez test to determine if
the probation condition was reasonable. 2 ' In applying the first
part of the Dominguez test, the Rodriguez court found the probation condition did not relate to the crime of which the defendant
was convicted because the defendant's pregnancy did not relate to
the crime of child abuse, i.e., pregnancy was not the cause of the
(Wis. 1972); State v. Mizzles, 485 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
Accepting probation does not waive the probationer's right to later challenge the
conditions of probation on appeal. People v. Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. 62, 64 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
16. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293. In Dominguez, a 20 year-old unmarried
female was convicted of second-degree robbery. Id. at 292. One of the conditions
of the defendant's probation was that she not become pregnant without first
getting married. Id. In applying the first part of the Dominguez test, the court
stated that the probation condition had no relationship to the crime of which the
defendant committed because the defendant's future pregnancy had no
relationship to the crime of robbery. Id. at 293. In applying the second part of
the Dominguez test, the court held the probation condition related to conduct
which was not in itself criminal because becoming pregnant was not a crime. Id.
In applying the third part of the Dominguez test, the court held the probation
condition forbid conduct which was not reasonably related to future criminality
because the defendant's future pregnancy did not reasonably relate to future
robberies. Id. The court held that since the condition of probation did not
reasonably relate to the purpose of probation (i.e., was not reasonable) under its
test, the condition was invalid. Id. at 294.
17. Id.
18. 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 9.
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child abuse.22 In applying the second part of the Dominguez test,
the court held the probation condition related to conduct that was
not itself criminal because becoming pregnant was not a crime. 23
In applying the third part of the Dominguez test, the court held
the probation condition forbid conduct which was not reasonably
related to future criminality, i.e., future child abuse, because if the
defendant became pregnant, the court could protect the newborn
child by taking the child out of the custody of the defendant. 24
The court concluded that since the probation condition met the
three criteria of the Dominguez test, the condition was not reasonable, and therefore invalid.25
Similarly, like Rodriguez, the Norplant probation condition
meets all three criteria of the Dominguez test. First, forced birth
control has no relationship to the crime of child abuse.26 Child
abuse is generally caused by lack of parenting skills and stresses,
not by having too many babies. Second, the Norplant probation
condition relates to conduct which is not itself criminal because
becoming pregnant and bearing children are not crimes. 2' Third,
the Norplant probation condition forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality because a court can avoid
any abuse toward a newborn child by taking the child out of the
abuser's custody until the child abuser can control her abusive
behavior. 29 Thus, under the Dominguez test, the Norplant probation condition is not a reasonable condition of probation, and
therefore is invalid.
B. A ProbationerCannot Give Her Informed Consent to Use
Norplant as a Condition of Probation
If probation involves the use of medical treatment, the probationer must give his or her informed consent to the use of such
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. See also State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App.
1976) (holding a probation condition which prohibits a woman convicted of child
abuse from becoming pregnant is invalid under the Dominguez test); Howland v.
State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding a probation
condition which prohibited a man convicted of child abuse from begetting
children was invalid under the Dominguez test).
26. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
27. See YER FERNANDEZ-ALDANA, CHn.D ABUSE: AN OvERviEw 163 (1991).
28. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
29. See id.
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medical treatment. ° Informed consent 3 involves two elements.
First, a physician must disclose to the individual all the relevant
information about the medical treatment. 32 This includes any
known dangers associated with the treatment, the advantages of
the treatment, the disadvantages of foregoing the treatment, and
any alternative treatment that may be available. 3 Second, once a
physician informs the individual of all the relevant information
about the medical treatment, the individual must freely and voluntarily decide whether to go through with the treatment.3 4
Since Norplant is a medical treatment, a probationer must
give her informed consent to the use of Norplant as a condition of
her probation. 5 The first element of informed consent, which
requires a physician to disclose to the individual all the relevant
information about the medical treatment, cannot be met. This
problem occurs because when a judge offers a probationer the
choice between going to prison and using Norplant, the probationer must make an on-the-spot decision whether to accept the
Norplant probation condition. A physician is not present in court
when a judge offers a convicted child abuser probation which is
conditioned on the use of Norplant. Thus, a probationer will have
to choose whether to use Norplant without being informed of all
the relevant medical information concerning Norplant.36
Furthermore, the Norplant probation condition does not satisfy the second element of informed consent, which requires an
individual to freely and voluntarily decide whether to go through
with the treatment.37 An individual cannot freely and voluntarily
consent to medical treatment if there is an element of coercion
30. See People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). See
also William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape
Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 15,
(1986).
31. The underlying premise of informed consent is that "[e]very human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his [or her] own body...." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id. at 787. "True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed
exercise of choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the
options available and the risks attendant upon each." Id. at 780.
34. Id.
35. See Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d at 316.
36. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
37. Id.
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involved in the giving of such consent. 3 For example, in People v.
Gauntlett, 9 the Michigan Appellate Court held a judge could not
condition a convicted rapist's probation on the rapist using the
drug Depo-Provera. 40 Depo-Provera is a drug which essentially
destroys a person's sex drive. 4 1 A factor contributing to the court's
holding was the inability of the convicted offender to give his
informed consent to the use of Depo-Provera as a condition of his
probation.42 The court inferred that because of the coerciveness of
consent
probation, the defendant could not freely and voluntarily
43
to the use of Depo-Provera as a condition of probation.
Similarly, like Gauntlett,because of the coerciveness of probation, a probationer will not be able to freely and voluntarily consent to use Norplant as a condition of probation. Probation
conditioned on Norplant use is coercive because a woman is given
a choice between using Norplant and going to prison. Clearly, a
woman cannot freely and voluntarily consent to use Norplant
when her only alternative is going to prison.4 4 Thus, a probationer cannot give informed consent to use Norplant.
C. Liability to a State Which Uses The Norplant Probation
Condition
A state which uses the Norplant probation condition leaves
itself open to a civil lawsuit brought by a probationer. For
instance, the probationer may be injured if a physician does not
properly insert the Norplant device. Since it is the state who
ordered the medical treatment, the probationer inevitably will sue
38. See generally People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-194-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne
County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
39. 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
40. Id. at 314.
41. Id. at 315.
42. Id. at 317.
43. Id. at 316. The Gauntlett court did not explicitly state the probationer
could not freely and voluntarily consent to the use of Depo-Provera as a condition
of probation because of the coerciveness of probation. Instead, the Gauntlett
court listed the elements needed for informed consent and then, without stating
why, held that one of the reasons the condition was invalid was because the
probationer could not give his informed consent to use the drug Depo-Provera as
a condition of probation. See id.
44. See Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 317. See also Green, supra note 30, at 17
(stating that it is impossible for a convicted offender to choose freely and
voluntarily between using the drug Depo-Provera as a condition of probation and
going to jail).
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the state. The cost to defend these lawsuits, as well as any damage awards, will come out of the taxpayers' pockets.
Furthermore, it may be discovered in the future that Norplant causes severe medical problems, as for example with breast
implants. In the breast implant situation, thousands of women
who experienced problems brought civil suits against manufacturers of the implants. A similar situation would likely happen if it is
determined that Norplant causes severe medical problems. Not
only would the probationer sue the manufacturer of Norplant, but
she also would likely sue the state which ordered her to use
Norplant.
Additionally, it is a judge who orders the probationer to use
Norplant, not a physician. Thus, a judge who orders a woman to
use Norplant is practicing medicine without a license. Therefore,
because the Norplant probation condition may cost taxpayers millions of dollars in civil suits brought by probationers, the Norplant
probation condition should not be used.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF USING NORPLANT AS

A

PROBATION CONDITION

A.

The Norplant Probation Condition Violates a Probationer's
FundamentalRight to Procreate

Although the United States Constitution does not specifically
mention the right to procreate, the Supreme Court recognizes the
right to procreate as a fundamental right,4 5 and one that grew out
of the right to privacy.4 6 One of the main aspects of the right to
45. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. The Justices on the Supreme Court have disagreed on the origin of the
right to privacy. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court in Griswold, believed the right to privacy is not found in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 482. Rather, Douglas
stated the right to privacy is found in the penumbras of the various guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Id. According to Douglas, the "[v]arious guarantees create
zones of privacy." Id.
Commentators argue the reason Douglas refused to base the right to privacy
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was because he did not
want to follow the highly criticized case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). See generally Brett J. Williamson, The ConstitutionalPrivacy Doctrine
After Bowers v. Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due
Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297 (1987). In Lochner, the Court held
unconstitutional a law which limited the number of hours a baker could work
each week. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. The Lochner Court stated the law was
unconstitutional because it unjustifiably interfered with the liberty to contract in
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privacy includes the right to make certain personal decisions without unjustified governmental interference. 47 The personal decisions that come under the protection of the right to privacy are

an employer/employee relationship. Id. According to the Lochner court, the
liberty to contract was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Lochner, see generally Helen
Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review; Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986).
Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, argued the textual source of the
right to privacy comes from the Ninth Amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Justice Goldberg argued the Court is not limited to
protecting only fundamental rights that are specifically in the text of the
Constitution. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487. He stated that an examination of the
Ninth Amendment shows the framers of the Constitution intended for the
government not to infringe upon certain fundamental rights that were not
specifically named in the Constitution. Id. at 488. According to Justice
Goldberg, the fundamental right to privacy was one of the rights retained in the
Ninth Amendment. Id. at 499. The more common rationale for the right to
privacy, however, is the right to privacy is part of the "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Williamson, supra, at
1310.
47. Carey v. Population Serv. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). The right to
make certain personal decisions without unjustified government interference has
also been called the right to personal autonomy. Tiffany M. Romney, Prosecuting
Mothers of Drug-ExposedBabies: The State's Interest in Protectingthe Rights of a
Fetus Versus the Mother's Constitutional Rights to Due Process, Privacy and
Equal Protection, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 325, 329 (1991).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/3
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49
48
usually decisions that concern child-rearing, marital relations,
and procreation.50
While Supreme Court decisions regarding child-rearing and
marital relations formed the basis for recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, the decisions most pertinent to evaluating
Norplant's use as a condition of probation are those involving procreation. Griswold v. Connecticut5 ' was the first Supreme Court
decision to recognize the right to procreate as part of an individual's fundamental right to privacy.5 2 In Griswold, the Court
struck down a statute5 3 which restricted the right of married per-

48. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925). In Pierce, Oregon enacted a statute which required every parent to
send their children, aged eight to sixteen, to public school. Id. at 530. The
Supreme Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional, holding the statute
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534. The Court
held the decision whether to send a child to public or private school is strictly a
private decision with which the government may not interfere because parents
have a fundamental right to control their children's education. Id. See also
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding a statute which prohibited the
teaching of any language other than English in school was unconstitutional
because it interferes with a parent's fundamental right to control his/her
children's education). Both Pierce and Meyer acknowledge that decisions in
private family matters are inherent in the concept of liberty that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Pierce and
Meyer did not specifically state the statute violated an individual's right to
privacy, both are continually cited as being "right to privacy" cases. E.g., Carey,
431 U.S. at 685.
49. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, the Court held
unconstitutional a statute which prohibited interracial marriages. Id. at 12.
The Court stated the decision of whom to marry is an individual decision that
could not be interfered with by the government because the right to decide whom
to marry is a fundamental right. Id. The Loving court also struck down the
statute on Equal Protection grounds. Id.
50. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE L.J. &
FEMINISM 327, 333 (1991). Griswold was responsible for laying the foundation
for privacy law. Id.
53. Section 53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut read: "Any person
who uses any drug, mechanical article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined no less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. Further, section 54-196 read: "Any person who
assists, abets, counsels, hires, or commands another to commit any offense may
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." Id.
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sons to use contraceptives.54 The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it unjustifiably interfered with a married couple's
right to decide whether to procreate. 5 5 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 6
the Supreme Court extended this holding to unmarried persons as
well,5 7 stressing the right to procreate is an individual right.58
Therefore, it cannot be reserved only to married couples. 5 9 The
Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
60
child."
Through decisions such as Griswold and Eisenstadt, the
Court has established the right to procreate is a fundamental
right.6 1 A court applies "strict scrutiny" when evaluating state
actions that infringe on fundamental rights. 62 Therefore, state
infringement on a person's fundamental right to procreate must
be subjected to strict scrutiny.6 3 Under the strict scrutiny analysis, a state can infringe on a fundamental right only if: (1) the
state has a compelling interest in doing so, and (2) the means chosen are necessary to achieve the state's compelling interest.6 4
Conditioning a woman's probation on her using Norplant
infringes on a woman's fundamental right to procreate. As the
Eisenstadt court held, the Constitution protects "the [fundamental] right of the individual.., to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into... the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 65 Clearly, a state intrudes on a woman's decision whether
to bear a child when it orders her to use Norplant as a condition of
54. Id. at 486. In Griswold, a physician was convicted of violating the birth
control statute because he gave information and medical advice to individuals
about the different methods available to prevent pregnancy. Id. at 480. The
physician also examined individuals and gave advice on what contraceptive
device he believed the individuals should use. Id.
55. Id.
56. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
57. In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a statute which prohibited the
distribution of contraceptive devices to unmarried people. Id. at 453.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Carey v. Population Serv. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1976).
63. Id.
64. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971)
65. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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probation. Courts reviewing such state action therefore, must
apply strict scrutiny; i.e., a state must have a compelling interest
to justify its infringement on a probationer's fundamental right to
procreate and the Norplant probation condition must be necessary
66
to achieve the state's compelling interests.
This writer does not argue the proposition that a
state has a
compelling interest to justify its infringement on a probationer's
fundamental right to procreate. Indeed, numerous courts have
held a state's interest in rehabilitating the probationer and protecting the public from the probationer committing future crimes
are compelling state interests for restricting a probationer's fundamental rights. It is the second part of the strict scrutiny test
which the Norplant probation condition cannot satisfy.
As previously noted, in order to survive the strict scrutiny
analysis, the probation condition must be necessary to achieve the
state's compelling interest. 8 A probation condition is not necessary to rehabilitate the probationer and protect the public if alternative probation conditions are available which are less restrictive
of the probationer's fundamental rights and will adequately serve
the state's interest in rehabilitation and public safety. 6 9 If a
66. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(labeling the standard of review which is applied when probation conditions
implicate a probationer's fundamental rights, "special scrutiny").
67. Owens v. Kelly, 681 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding states have
a compelling interest in rehabilitating probationers and protecting the public
from the probationer). See also United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 751
(11th Cir. 1988); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
People v. Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Pointer,
199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
68. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
69. Id. See also Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269 (holding a condition of
probation, which prohibits a woman convicted of drug possession from becoming
pregnant, is invalid because there were other conditions, less drastic than an
outright ban on pregnancy that could be used to rehabilitate the probationer and
protect the public); People v. Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. 62, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
People v. Watkins, 239 Cal. Rptr. 255, 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v.
Arvanites, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d
313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Wis.
1976) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (arguing the condition of probation in
question should have been held invalid because there were less restrictive
conditions available that would adequately rehabilitate the probationer and
would have protected the public).
Some courts do not require probation conditions which infringe on a
probationer's fundamental rights to be the least restrictive condition available to
rehabilitate the probationer and protect the public. See Oyoghok v. Anchorage,
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reviewing court finds the probation condition is not necessary to
rehabilitate the probationer and protect the public, the court will
641 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). Instead, these courts invoke a
"balancing test," balancing the state's interest in rehabilitating the probationer
and protecting the public against the probationer's liberty interest. Thomas E.
Bartrum, Comment, Birth Control as a Condition of Probation:A New Weapon in
the War Against Child Abuse, 80 Ky. L.J. 1037, 1042 (1992). Under this
standard, if the state's interest outweighs the impairment of the probationer's
fundamental right's, the condition is valid. Id. The court in Oyoghok applied
this "balancing test" to determine the validity of a probation condition which
infringed on the probationer's fundamental rights. Oyoghok, 641 P.2d at 1270.
In Oyoghok, the defendant was convicted for soliciting prostitution. Id. at 1268.
As a condition of probation, the defendant was prohibited from going within two
blocks of a certain street in downtown Anchorage, where a number of prostitutes
gathered. Id. The defendant challenged the probation condition as being
unconstitutional. Id. In balancing the state's interest in rehabilitation and
public safety against the probationer's First Amendment rights, the court held
the probation condition was valid. Id. at 1269. The court acknowledged the
condition could have been more narrowly drawn. Id. at 1268. Nevertheless, the
court stated the condition was not per se invalid because the condition did not
create a "chilling" effect on the probationer's exercise of her First Amendment
rights and because regulating the probationer's conduct this way "falls within
the realm of the municipality's legitimate interest. . . ." Id.
Furthermore, some courts apply what has been called the Tonry test. See
United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979). Under the Tonry test,
when determining the validity of probation conditions which infringe on a
probationer's fundamental rights, the court weighs three factors: "(1)
rehabilitating the probationer and protecting the public; (2) the extent to which
constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to
probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Id. at 150. This
test does not require the condition to be the least restrictive condition available.
See id.
In Tonry, the defendant, a congressman, plead guilty to receiving over $1000
in political contributions, violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. at
146. As a condition of probation, the defendant was "not to run for political office
nor engage in political activity during the period of probation." Id. The
defendant challenged the condition, claiming that it was invalid because it
infringed on his constitutional rights. Id. at 150. In weighing the three factors,
the court stated the condition would deprive the defendant of some of his
constitutional rights, but stated the condition would sufficiently rehabilitate the
probationer and protect the public. Id. at 151. The court noted, under the
circumstances, depriving the defendant of some of his constitutional rights was
appropriate. Id. A number of commentators have criticized the standards used
in Oyoghok and Tonry, which do not require the probation condition to be the
least restrictive probation condition available to further a state's interest in
rehabilitation and public safety. See generally Sunny A.M. Koshy, The Right of
All the People to Be Secure: Extending FundamentalFourthAmendment Rights
to Probationersand Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449 (1980).
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hold the condition invalid for
unnecessarily restricting a proba70
rights.
fundamental
tioner's
For example, in People v. Pointer,7 1 the defendant, a mother
of two children, was convicted of child endangerment. 72 The judge
placed the defendant on probation. One of the conditions of probation was "she not conceive during the probationary period." 73 The
defendant challenged the condition as an unconstitutional restriction on her fundamental right to procreate. 4
The Pointer court, in recognizing the probation condition
infringed on the defendant's fundamental right to procreate, subjected the probation condition to the strict scrutiny analysis. 75
The court acknowledged the state had a compelling interest to justify its infringement on the defendant's fundamental right to procreate.7 6 The court then moved to the second part of the strict
scrutiny analysis and stated the probation condition must be
entirely necessary to achieve the state's compelling interest.7 7
The Pointer court held the condition was invalid because the condition was not entirely necessary to rehabilitate the probationer
and protect the public. 78 In fact, the Pointer court noted the condition did nothing at all to rehabilitate the probationer.7 9
In terms of protecting the public, the Pointer court believed
the condition was intended to protect the public by preventing
injury to an unborn child. 80 The Pointer court stated, however,
the purpose of preventing injury to an unborn child could be
achieved by alternative, less restrictive, probation conditions. 8
For instance, the Pointer court stated the state could require
the defendant to take pregnancy tests throughout probation.8 2
Further, if the defendant became pregnant, the court stated the
70. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (stating "[i]f available means exists which
are less violative of a constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to
correlate more closely with the purpose contemplated, those alternatives should
be used").
71. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
72. Id. at 365.
73. Id. at 360.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
82. Id.
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state could require the defendant to follow prenatal and neonatal
treatment.8 3 Moreover, the court found the state could protect an
infant born during the probationary period by placing the infant
in a foster home.8 4 Thus, because there were alternative, less
restrictive, probation conditions that would adequately rehabilitate the probationer and protect the public, the court held the pro5
bation condition invalid.

Similarly, a state cannot force a woman convicted of child
abuse to use Norplant as a condition of her probation because such
a condition is not necessary to rehabilitate the child abuser"6 and
protect the public. In fact, Norplant is not even conducive to these
objectives.8 7 Child abuse 8 is caused by lack of parenting skills

and stresses of everyday life." 9 Norplant will not rehabilitate a
child abuser because Norplant does not alter a child abuser's
destructive behavior, nor will it teach proper parenting skills or
ways to channel everyday stresses in non-abusive directions. Furthermore, Norplant does not protect the public from the effects of
child abuse because Norplant does nothing to stop the convicted
child abuser from abusing her existing children. Additionally,
Norplant does nothing to protect future children of the child
abuser since the woman may bear and abuse children after the
probationary term.
Even assuming, arguendo, the Norplant probation condition
does rehabilitate the child abuser and protect the public, it would
still be an invalid probation condition because, like Pointer, less
restrictive probation conditions are available that would adequately serve these interests. For instance, a court could require
convicted child abusers to attend counselling programs designed
to treat the problems of child abuse. Proper counselling programs
will rehabilitate the probationer by teaching the child abuser
parenting skills that will enable her to channel her anger and
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Because this Article focuses on women who are convicted on child abuse,
"child abuser" refers to the female child abuser.
87. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (holding a condition of probation which
prohibits a woman convicted of child endangerment from conceiving any children
does not rehabilitate the child abuser).
88. Child abuse includes, among other things, physical abuse, as well as
emotional abuse. YER FERNANDEZ-ALDANA, supra note 27, at 164.
89. See generally YEa FERNANDEZ-ALDANA, supra note 27.
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frustration in non-abusive directions. 90 Counselling programs
also will protect the public because the child abuser will be monitored constantly by trained professionals who will be able to detect
if the child abuser is continuing her abusive behavior.
A number of courts have used a similar probation condition
for individuals convicted of drunk driving. In those cases, the various judges ordered the defendants to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings as part of their probation.
This probation
condition has proven very successful. Many individuals who have
been ordered to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings have
stated the meetings have helped them with their drinking
problem. 9 1
Court-ordered counselling programs for convicted child abusers should have similar success. At the very least, such a probation condition is clearly less restrictive than the Norplant
probation condition. Therefore, because there is a less restrictive
probation condition available that would adequately serve a
state's interest in rehabilitating the'probationer and protecting
the public, forcing a woman to use Norplant as a condition of probation is an unconstitutional infringement on her fundamental
right to procreate. As a result, the use of Norplant as a condition
of probation is invalid.
B.

The Norplant ProbationCondition Violates a Probationer's
FundamentalRight to be Free From Cruel and Unusual
Punishment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 92 The
Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." 93 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment has changed over the years. 94 Originally, the Court
interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit only barbaric pun90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Scott Miller, Clean and Sober, Back and Playing:After the Year
He Threw Away, SDSU's Tracey Mao Returns, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1992, at A5.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
93. Id.
94. See generally Licia A. Esposito, The Constitutionality of Executing
Juvenile and Mentally Retarded Offenders:A PresidentialAnalysis and Proposal
For Reconsideration, 31 B.C. L. REV. 901, 913 (1990).
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ishments because the Court felt this was the intent of the framers
95
of the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, however, has long since rejected that
interpretation. The Supreme Court has held the cruel and unusual punishment clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."96 Consequently, the Eighth Amendment prohibits all punishments that modern society would consider to be "cruel" and
97
"unusual."

95. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
96. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
97. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. Courts generally use two approaches to determine
how contemporary society view a particular punishment. Esposito, supra note
94, at 910. One approach is called the "Contemporary Consensus Approach." Id.
at 912. This approach is generally used when the court is deciding if a
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime. See generally id. Under
this approach, the court looks at certain objective factors to determine how
contemporary society views a particular punishment. Id. at 912. Some of the
objective factors that courts look at include jury behavior and legislative
enactments. Id. This approach is based on empirical data. Id. at 913. The
Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982), used this approach to
determine if a particular punishment was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
In Enmund, the defendant was convicted of murder under the felony murder
rule. Id. at 785. The defendant, however, did not actually do the killing. Id.
The defendant also did not attempt to kill the victim, nor did the defendant
intend for the victim to die. Id. at 784. The jury sentenced the defendant to
death. Id. at 785. The defendant appealed, claiming that it would be cruel and
unusual punishment to sentence him to death since he did not actually do the
killing, did not attempt to kill the victim, and did not intend for the victim to die.
Id. at 786.
The Court, in order to ascertain society's view on imposing the death penalty
in such a situation, looked at jury practices and legislative judgments. Id. at
789. The Court noted that "eleven states require some culpable mental state
with respect to the homicide as a prerequisite to conviction of a crime for which
the death penalty is authorized." Id. at 789-90. The Court then found "[only]
eight [states] allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the defendant
somehow participated in a robbery, in the course of which a murder was
committed." Id. at 792. The Court also stated "[slociety's rejection of the death
penalty . . . in felony murder rule cases is also indicated by the sentencing
decisions that juries have made." Id. at 794. The Court stated "[tihe jury... is a
significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so
directly involved." Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)).
From these objective factors, the Court held contemporary societies would view
sentencing the defendant to death for the crime he committed as cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 801.
In addition to using the "Contemporary Consensus Approach," some courts
state it is the job of the Justices to decide if a punishment is cruel and unusual.
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The use of Norplant as a probation condition is governmentally forced medical treatment, and a number of courts have held
such medical treatment to be cruel and unusual punishment.9 8
For example, in Knecht v. Gillman,9 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held it was cruel and unusual punishment to inject prisoners with the drug apomorphine because the drug had no therapeutic value.1"' The court rejected the state's argument that the
drug was administered for the purpose of treating behavior
problems of prisoners because there was inconclusive evidence
that such a drug did in fact treat behavior problems. 10 1 Just as
apomorphine has no therapeutic value for a prisoner with behavior problems, Norplant has no therapeutic value for a child
abuser. As previously stated, Norplant does not address the root
causes of child abuse, 10 2 but is instead administered simply for
the purpose of temporarily sterilizing a woman.
Further, a United States District Court in Indiana, in Nelson
v. Heyne, 10 3 held it was cruel and unusual punishment to inject
juveniles in a correctional institute with tranquilizing drugs
because the drugs had significant side effects. 10 4 Norplant also
has a number of significant side effects including breast discharge,
irregular menstrual bleeding, headaches, acne, and significant
skin reactions. 10 5 Additionally, Norplant is a new medical treatCommentators argue this approach is inadequate to determine the evolving
standards of decency because often what the Justices believe to be the evolving
standards of decency is contrary to what jury decisions show. See Esposito,
supra note 94, at 916.
Other courts determine the evolving standards of decency by determining if
the particular punishment violates a person's dignity. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
Under this standard, if a punishment strips a person of their dignity, the
punishment is contrary to the evolving standards of decency. See id.
98. The Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause applies to
probation conditions. See State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985). See
also Green, supra note 30, at 20.
99. 488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 1140. Apomorphine, which causes vomiting, is administered as an
"adverse stimuli." Id. at 1137.
101. Id. at 1138.
102. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
Norplant has no therapeutic value.
103. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
104. Id. at 455.
105. For a list of common side affects associated with Norplant use, see Ridgely
Ochs, The Latest in Birth Control Methods, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 1992, at 61;
Zuber, Skin Damage Associated With The Norplant Contraceptive,J. FAM. PRAc.,
May 1992, at 613-16.
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ment and history has shown that many new medical treatments
which physicians have claimed to be safe have turned out to be
extremely hazardous to one's health. 10 6 Similarly, since Norplant
is such a new medical treatment, more serious side effects may be
discovered in the future.
Other courts have held that punishing an individual by forcing him or her to use a medical treatment which has the effect of
destroying the individual's power to procreate is cruel and unusual punishment. 10 7 For example, in Mickle v. Henrichs ° 8 the
United States District Court in Nevada held that punishing a man
by forcing him to have a vasectomy is cruel and unusual punishment because it would strip him of his dignity. 109 The court found
it extremely degrading and humiliating for a man to subject himself to a vasectomy as punishment because it would take away his
power to procreate,"' which is considered "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the [human] race."' The Supreme
Court also has held that "[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."" 2
Forcing a woman to use Norplant as a condition of probation
strips a woman of her dignity in much the same way a vasectomy
strips a man of his dignity. Norplant temporarily destroys a
woman's ability to procreate. Unfortunately, since society often
associates womanhood with a woman's ability to bear a child
much the same way society associates manhood with the ability to
beget a child, it would be extremely humiliating for a woman to
have her ability to procreate taken away. The probationer, and
the people around her, will be constantly reminded of her inability
to procreate since the Norplant device protrudes from a woman's
arm. Further, the fact a vasectomy permanently destroys a man's
power to procreate while the use of Norplant only temporarily
destroys a woman's power to procreate does not mean forcing a
woman to use Norplant is any less cruel or unusual. A woman
will not feel any less humiliated or feel any less degraded during
106. It was not long ago that most physicians claimed breast implants were
safe. Now, however, breast implants are known to pose serious health risks to
women. See Marilyn Elias, TransferringFat to Breasts Pose Risk, USA TODAY,
Oct. 6, 1992, at 1D.
107. See, e.g., Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
108. 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
109. Id. at 690.
110. Id. at 690.
111. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
112. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
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the period the Norplant device is in her arm simply because she
knows the device will eventually be removed. Moreover, a
woman's period of fertility is not indefinite, and ordering a woman
over age thirty to use Norplant for three years would significantly
reduce, or possibly eliminate, her opportunity to have children.
Therefore, as shown above under Knecht, Nelson, and Mickle,
forcing a probationer to use Norplant as a condition of probation is
cruel and unusual punishment.
C.

The Norplant ProbationCondition May Violate a
Probationer'sFundamental Right to Freely Exercise Her
Religion

Certain religious denominations, most notably the Roman
Catholic Church, are opposed to birth control. 1 13 For this reason,
the Norplant probation condition may violate a probationer's fundamental right to freedom of religion. Freedom of religion is protected by two distinct clauses in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution." 4 The first is the Establishment
Clause, which prohibits the government from making any "law
respecting an establishment of religion . . ".15 The second
clause, which is pertinent in evaluating Norplant as a probation
6
condition, is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from enacting
any law which prohibits an individual from freely exercising his or
her religion. 1 7 Freely exercising one's religion includes the right
113. See Aids Can't Justify Condoms, Pope Says, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1988, at
C25.
114. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
115. Id. For an interesting discussion on the Establishment Clause, see
generally Steve Grey, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict
Interpretationof the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1981).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion on the historical development of
the Free Exercise Clause, see generally Angela C. Carmella, A Theological
Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence,60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 782 (1992).
117. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). A question arises
as to what constitutes a "religion" under the Free Exercise Clause. Although the
Supreme Court has not identified specifically what religions are covered by the
Free Exercise Clause, the Court has held a religion need not be one that believes
in God. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding a government may
not require an individual to profess his or her belief in God in order to hold public
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to believe in whatever religion one desires. "I It also includes the
right to act in accordance with one's religion, or abstaining from
some act (for example, abstaining from using contraceptives)
because one's religion forbids such action. 119
Early Supreme Court decisions took the view that, under the
Free Exercise Clause, the government is prohibited from enacting
laws which regulate religious beliefs, but is free to enact laws
which would simply burden an individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her religion.' 2 0 In 1963, however, the Supreme
Court in Sherbert v. Verner 12 1 rejected this narrow view of the
Free Exercise Clause. In Sherbert, the Court held if a state burdens an individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her
religion, the state must show it has a compelling interest and the
means chosen to protect this interest are necessary. 22
In Sherbert, the appellant was fired from her employment
because she refused to work on Saturdays, in observance of her
religious beliefs. 123 The State denied the appellant's claim for
unemployment compensation because the State considered the
appellant to be in violation of a state statute. 12 4 According to the
office, for such a requirement would violate an individual's First Amendment
right to freedom of religion). Furthermore, a religious belief does not have to
result from a tenet or teaching of an established religion, as long as it is a
sincerely held religious belief. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489
U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
118. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (stating "[tihe door of the
Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation
of religious beliefs ...
.
119. Cf id.
120. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). Reynolds was the
first Supreme Court decision to interpret the Free Exercise Clause. In Reynolds,
a Mormon challenged a federal statute which prohibited polygamy, claiming
such a statute violated his right to freely exercise his religion. Id. at 160. The
Mormon claimed polygamy was a required practice of his religion. Id. Since the
statute did not regulate religious beliefs, but only regulated a person's ability to
act in accordance with his or her religion, the Court upheld the statute. Id. at
168. The Court reasoned there would be ludicrous consequences if the
government was not permitted to regulate a person's ability to act in accordance
with his or her religion. See id. The Court stated, "[sluppose one believed that
human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously
contended that civil government under which he lived could not interfere to
prevent a sacrifice?" Id. at 166.
121. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
122. Id. at 403. The Sherbert Court applied the strict scrutiny standard.
123. Id. at 399. The appellant was a Seventh-day Adventist. Id.
124. Id.
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statute, individuals who failed to accept suitable work were not
eligible for unemployment compensation. 125 The State believed
because the appellant was unwilling to work on Saturdays, she
fell into the category of persons who failed "to accept suitable
work.

" 1 26

The Court found the statute burdened the appellant's freedom
to act in accordance with her religion because it had the coercive
effect of forcing the appellant to choose between acting in accord1 27
ance with her religious beliefs and receiving a state benefit.
The State claimed its compelling interest for the statute was to
prevent persons from fraudulently claiming they can not work on
Saturdays because of religious reasons in an effort to qualify for
unemployment compensation.128 The Court, however, found there
1 29
to be no evidence that such fraudulent actions would occur.
Furthermore, the Court stated there were less restrictive means
that could adequately serve the state's interest. 130 Thus, the
Court held the statute as applied to the appellant violated the
Free Exercise Clause, and therefore, it was unconstitutional.' 3 '
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v.
Smith 132 drastically narrowed the protection afforded by the Free
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 404. The Court acknowledged the appellant's free exercise of her
religious beliefs was only indirectly burdened. Id. at 403. Nevertheless, the
Court held "if the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or
all religions, the law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect." Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
,U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
128. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. The State was afraid these fraudulent claims
would have the effect of diluting the unemployment compensation funds. Id.
The State also found that fraudulent claims of inability to work on Saturdays for
religious reasons would have a detrimental effect on employers because
employers might have problems finding employees to work on Saturdays. Id.
129. Id. The Court also found it need not determine whether such a state
interest is in fact compelling because the State did not raise such a claim in the
state supreme court. Id.
130. Id. This is the "means" evaluation of the strict scrutiny analysis. See
Carey, 431 U.S. at 686. Under the strict scrutiny standard, even if a state has a
compelling interest in restricting an individual's fundamental rights, such state
action will be held invalid if the state could achieve its interest through less
restrictive means. Id.
131. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. Another way to say the statute is
unconstitutional, as applied to the appellant, is to say the appellant is granted an
"exemption" from the statute. Smith, 494 U.S. at 896.
132. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Exercise Clause which was enumerated in Sherbert.3 3 The issue
in Smith was whether a state could enforce a criminal law, which
prohibited the use of the drug peyote, against an individual where
the enforcement of such criminal law would burden the individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her religion.13 4 The
Court in Smith refused to apply the strict scrutiny test used in
Sherbert.135 Instead, the Smith Court held that, under the Free
Exercise Clause, a criminal law can be enforced against individuals even if such enforcement would burden the individual's ability
to act in accordance with his or her religion as long as the criminal
1 36
law is not targeted at suppressing religious practices.
It may seem the Smith decision supports the contention that,
outside the unemployment compensation setting, the strict scru133. See id. at 884 (refusing to apply the strict scrutiny standard to determine
if the state action burdened the respondent's ability to act in accordance with
their religion).
134. Id. at 874. In Smith, the respondents, members of the Native American
Church, claimed it was part of their religion to ingest peyote. Id. at 872.
135. Id. at 884. The Court stated, "[to make an individual's obligation to obey
such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the state's interest is 'compelling,' [would permit] him, by virtue of his
beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself' .

. . ."

Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v.

United States, 98 U.S. 145, 169 (1878)). Furthermore, the Court stated if it did
apply the strict scrutiny standard, "[tihe government's ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct" would "depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development." Id. at 885 (quoting Ling v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n.,
485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). Moreover, in addition to Smith, the Supreme Court
has also refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard used in Sherbert in other
Free Exercise cases. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. However, the cases in which
the Court has refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard were cases that dealt
with a "particularized" governmental interest. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986). In Goldman, a Jewish Air Force captain claimed his right to
freely exercise his religious beliefs was violated by an Air Force regulation which
prohibited him from wearing his yarmulke while on duty. Id. at 505. Without
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court held the Air Force regulation
reasonably related to the military interest of uniformity. Id. at 510. The
respondent, therefore, was not entitled to an exemption from the regulation. Id.
The Court stressed that a different standard of review should be applied in the
military context. Id. This is illustrated in the Court's statement, "[o]ur review of
military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for
civilian society." Id. at 507. The Court further stated, "[tihe Military need not
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required
of the civilian state by the First Amendment." Id.
136. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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tiny standard used in Sherbert no longer applies when a state burdens an individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her
religion. 13 7 However, the Smith holding can be read to apply only
to cases where there is a criminal prohibition against the particular conduct. 13 8 This is exemplified by the Court's statement that
"[elven if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply
it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
law." 139 This statement strongly implies the Court may be willing
to apply the strict scrutiny standard used in Sherbert in cases
where there is no criminal prohibition against the particular conduct. Thus, under this reading of Smith, if a state burdens an
individual's ability to act in accordance with his or her religion,
and there is no criminal prohibition against such conduct, a court
would apply the strict scrutiny standard used in Sherbert. 4 °
Conditioning a woman's probation on her using Norplant may
burden her ability to act in accordance with her religion because
there are certain religions that strictly prohibit the use of contraceptives. 4 ' Thus, if the probationer follows one of these religions,
conditioning her probation on her using Norplant will burden her
ability to act in accordance with her religion because she will be
forced to choose between the offer of probation and exercising her
religious beliefs. 142 If she exercises her religious beliefs and
refuses the Norplant probation condition, she will have to go to
prison. 14 3 The threat of going to prison is a significant burden on
137. See id. This was the view the Supreme Court cases took before Sherbert.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
138. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. The Supreme Court, in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aya, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), did not resolve this issue.
139. Smith, 494 U.S. at 804.
140. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. For example, the Catholic religion prohibits the use of contraceptives. See

Aids Can't Justify Condoms, Pope Says, CHI.

TRiB.,

Nov. 13, 1988, at C25.

142. The fact that probation may be seen as a privilege does not diminish the
fact a probation condition violates an individual's right to freely exercise his or
her religion. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. The Sherbert Court held "the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. Further, the Court stated "conditions
upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their
purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment Freedoms." Id. at
405.
143. This is analogous to Sherbert, where, if the appellant exercised her
religious beliefs, she would not be able to collect unemployment compensation.
Id. at 404.
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a woman's right to freely exercise her religious beliefs against
contraceptives.
Since Norplant may burden a woman's ability to freely exercise her religious beliefs, the next question is what level of scrutiny will a court apply in evaluating the constitutionality of the
Norplant probation condition. The level of scrutiny depends on
whether a court applies Smith or Sherbert. 4 4 Because there is no
criminal prohibition against a woman refusing to use contraceptives, Smith is inapplicable. Thus, under Sherbert, a state must
show: (1) it has a compelling interest for conditioning a woman's
probation on her using Norplant, and (2) Norplant is the least
restrictive condition available to achieve the compelling
5
interest.

14

As previously noted, the state's compelling interest in conditioning a woman's probation on her using Norplant is to rehabilitate the child abuser and protect the public from future child
144. Under the Sherbert standard, if a state burdens an individual's ability to
act in accordance with his or her religion, the state must show it has a compelling
interest in doing so, and the means chosen to further the state's interest must be
the least restrictive means available. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. Under the
Smith standard, a criminal law can be enforced against individuals even if such
enforcement would burden the individual's ability to act in accordance with his
or her religion as long as the criminal law was not targeted at suppressing
religious practices. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The Supreme Court has not ruled on
a case where a probationer has challenged a probation condition for violating his
or her right to freedom of religion. A number of lower courts, however, have held
probation conditions should not be "incompatible with [an individual's] freedom
of religion." See State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
In Evans, the defendant was convicted of rape. Id. As part of his probation,
the defendant was ordered to attend a specific church throughout the duration of
his probation. Id. The defendant claimed the probation condition denied him the
free exercise of his religious faith. Id. The court applied the strict scrutiny
standard and held that a probation condition which forces a probationer to
attend a specific church is invalid as an unconstitutional infringement on a
probationers fundamental right to freely exercise his religion. Id. at 180.
Furthermore, in Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Va. 1946) the
court held a probation condition which required a probationer to attend Sunday
school and church was invalid for violating the probationer's right to freedom of
religion. Evans and Jones based their holdings on the fact that there were less
restrictive means available which could have adequately served the state's
interest in rehabilitating the probationer and protecting the public. See, e.g.,
Evans, 769 P.2d at 180. Because this standard of review is the same one applied
in Sherbert, both Evans and Jones lend support to applying the Sherbert,
instead of the Smith, standard when a state conditions a woman's probation on
her using Norplant.
145. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
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abuse. 146 However, as previously noted, there is a less restrictive
probation condition, counselling programs, that can achieve this
interest. Therefore, because the Norplant probation condition
fails the Sherbert test, Norplant is an unconstitutional probation
condition as applied to followers of religions which prohibit the
use of contraceptives.
D. The Norplant Probation Condition Violates the Equal
Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that people who are
similarly situated will be treated similarly. 147 Courts employ
three different standards of review in Equal Protection cases: (1)
the "mere rationality" standard, (2) the "intermediate-level" scrutiny standard, and (3) the "strict scrutiny" standard.
The "mere rationality" standard is the lowest-level standard
of review used in Equal Protection cases. Under this standard a
court will hold a classification invalid if there is no rational
relation between the classification and a legitimate legislative
objective.14 A court applies this standard when the classification is not based on a suspect class, or quasi-suspect
class. 149

The "intermediate-level" scrutiny standard is the next level of
scrutiny a court applies in Equal Protection cases. This standard
is more probing than the "mere rationality" standard. A court
applies the "intermediate-level" scrutiny standard when a classifi146. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
148. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). In Railway
Express, a New York law prohibited individuals from placing advertising on
vehicles, except that an owner of the vehicle could place advertising of his own
product on his vehicle. Id. at 108. The purpose behind the law was to reduce
traffic hazards. Id. at 109. The law was challenged on the basis that a vehicle
with advertising of an owner's product is no less distracting than the same
vehicle with advertising of other products. Id. The Court applied the "mere
rationality" standard and upheld the New York law. Id. at 110. The Court first
noted that reducing traffic hazards was a legitimate state interest. Id. The
Court then found the means chosen were rationally related to reducing traffic
hazards. Id. The Court stated "[iut is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Id.
149. The Supreme Court has identified three quasi-suspect classes: gender,

illegitimacy, and alienage.

See

JOHN

E. NowAK &

RONALD

ROTUNDA,

CONsTrruTIoNAL LAw 574 (4th ed. 1991). See also Mississippi University for
Woman v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99
(1982).
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cation is based on a quasi-suspect class, such as gender. 150 Under
this standard, a classification based on gender violates the Equal
Protection Clause unless the classification is substantially related
to an important state interest.15 1 A case in which the Supreme
Court applied the "intermediate-level" scrutiny standard to a gender-based classification is Craig v. Boren.5 2
In Craig, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of beer to
males under the age of twenty-one, and to females under the age
eighteen.'5 3 The statute was challenged as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because the statute treated males and
females differently. Oklahoma defended its statute by claiming
the law promoted an important state interest, traffic safety. 1 It
also claimed the classification was substantially related to the
achievement of traffic safety because more males than females
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were convicted of
drunk driving.' 5 5
Although the Court found traffic safety was an important
state interest, it struck down the statute because the classification
was not substantially related to traffic safety.15 6 The Court
focused on the fact that the difference between the number of
drunk driving convictions of males and females, ages eighteen to
1 57
twenty, was minuscule.
The most demanding standard of review which a court uses in
Equal Protection cases is the strict scrutiny standard. 5 8 A court
applies the strict scrutiny standard when a classification is based
on a suspect class, or when the classification impairs the exercise
of a fundamental right. 59 Under the strict scrutiny standard, the
150. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 149, at 574.
151. See DAvID CRUMP et al., CASES AND MATERIALUS ON

CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW

595 (1989).
152. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down a San

Francisco law which prohibited individuals from operating hand laundries in
wooden buildings, except with consent of the Board of Supervisors, because the
law was being administered in a discriminatory fashion).
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must be necessary to further a compelling state
classification
1 60
interest.
Furthermore, in the criminal law setting, classifications
based on wealth have triggered strict scrutiny. For example, Griffin v. Illinois16 ' dealt with an Illinois law which stated if an individual was convicted of a crime, such individual could appeal only
if he or she presented to the appellate court a transcript of proceedings in the lower court.1 6 2 The transcript, however, cost
money and the defendant in Griffin could not afford it.' 63 Thus,
he could not appeal his conviction.
The Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard and
struck down the Illinois law. The Court stated that "[i]n criminal
trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race, or color."' 6 4 The Court further stated:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution
to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.
But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review
can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted
defendants on account of their poverty.... There can be no equal
of trial a man gets depends on the amount
justice where the 1kind
65
of money he has.
The reasoning applied in Griffin can be used to strike down
the Norplant probation condition on Equal Protection grounds. If
a defendant decides she would rather use Norplant than go to jail,
she will have to pay for the Norplant device. The cost of the actual
Norplant device is between three and four hundred dollars.' 6 6 A
defendant will also have to pay the cost of surgically inserting and
removing the Norplant device.167 Thus, unless the defendant can
afford the cost of Norplant, she will have to go to prison. Just as
the defendant in Griffin could not obtain an appeal because he
could not afford a court transcript, a defendant who is poor (in the
Norplant probation context) will not be able to receive probation
because she will be unable to pay for Norplant. As a result, the
judicial system is putting a price on freedom. Therefore, under
160. Id.
161. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
162. Id. at 13.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 17.
165. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
166. Reshma Menon, The Double-Edged Sword of Norplant, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
24, 1993, at 11.
167. Id.
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Griffin, the Norplant probation condition violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The Norplant probation condition also violates the Equal Protection Clause because it affects similarly situated male and
female defendants differently. For instance, when a male defendant is convicted of child abuse, he is offered a much less restrictive
probation condition. A judge may place a male defendant convicted of child abuse on probation with the condition he does not
come into contact with the child he abused, or may require the
defendant to attend counselling programs. He is free to beget children during this probation period. However, a woman convicted of
the same crime may be offered only the much more restrictive probation condition, Norplant, which eliminates her ability to
procreate.
Since men and women, who are similarly situated, are being
treated differently, a court would apply the "intermediate-level"
scrutiny standard. 168 Under this standard, a classification based
on gender violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the classification is substantially related to an important state interest. 169 A
state will likely argue its important interest in implementing the
Norplant probation condition is to reduce the number of child
abuse cases. However, a probation scheme which treats male and
female child abusers differently is not substantially related to the
achievement of fewer child abuse cases." °
As this Article has established, Norplant should not be
ordered as a condition of probation because such a condition violates the Dominguez test as being unreasonable as a condition of
probation. Furthermore, a woman cannot give her informed consent to use Norplant as a condition of probation. Moreover, the
Norplant probation condition violates a number of fundamental
constitutional rights. As a result, an alternative probation condition is needed to rehabilitate child abusers and protect the public
from future child abuse.
168. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
169. See id.
170. In fact, as previously stated, preventing an individual (whether male or
female) from bearing or begetting children does nothing at all to prevent future
child abuse. See Pointer, 199 Cal Rptr. at 365. See also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541
(holding "[wihen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it
has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment"). But see Gudulig v. Alallo, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).
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PROPOSAL

Instead of conditioning a child abuser's probation on her
using Norplant, a judge sentencing a child abuser should require
him or her to attend Parents Anonymous meetings. Parents
Anonymous is a nonprofit group that offers free support programs
to parents who feel overwhelmed with the stresses and pressures
of parenting.1 7 1 Parents meet, usually once a week for172two hours,
to talk about the stresses and problems of parenting.
The goal of Parents Anonymous, unlike Norplant, is to end
child abuse through rehabilitating the abuser. Parents Anonymous teaches parents how to properly discipline their children
and helps parents develop coping skills.' 7 3 Parents Anonymous
also helps break the cycle of child abuse because the child abuser
will learn how to become a better parent, and thus, her children
will learn how to be good parents rather than learn to abuse their
own children.1 74 Furthermore, because these meetings receive
such positive feedback from the parents who attend them, the
probationer is likely to continue to attend these meetings after the
probationary period. Thus, unlike Norplant, Parents Anonymous
could become an on-going treatment for child abusers. Also, the
child abuser's friend, husband or wife may get involved in the
meetings, and thus, reinforce what the child abuser learns. This
is an added bonus over Norplant. Moreover, the Parents Anonymous probation condition does not suffer the shortcomings which
accompanies the use of Norplant as a condition of probation. The
Parents Anonymous probation condition is a reasonable probation
condition under the Dominguez test. There is no informed consent
problem because Parents Anonymous does not involve the use of a
medical treatment. This condition clearly does not violate a probationer's fundamental right to procreate because it does not interfere with a woman's decision whether to bear a child. It will not
violate a probationer's fundamental right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment because forcing a convicted child abuser to
attend Parents Anonymous meetings is not cruel and unusual. It
will not violate a probationer's fundamental right to freely exer171. Judi Light, Coping With ParentalBurnout, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1992, at

C7.
172. Id.
173. Linda W.Y. Parrish, Trying to be a Better Parent;Frustrated,or Fighting
the Cycle of Abuse, Parents Seeking a More Positive Approach Find Help From
Others Who Have Been There, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at Fl.
174. Id.
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cise her religion because such a condition does not burden the probationer's ability to act in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs. Finally, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because attendance at these meetings is free, and men and women
are not treated differently. Therefore, court-ordered Parents
Anonymous meetings are clearly a more appropriate probation
condition for child abusers than Norplant.
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